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Indirect Taxes
THE PRECEDING chapter sets forth some possible uses of cor-
poration taxes in a war finance program. Such taxes reduce
the purchasing power in the possession of the corporations
themselves, by absorbing corporate net income which, so far
as not distributed as dividends, could be invested by the cor-
porations, perhaps largely in the purchase of civilian goods.
They tend also to reduce the flow of dividends, and accord-
ingly the flow of purchasing power into the hands of those
individual consumers who are stockholders. They may reduce
also in some degree, through their indirect bearing upon cor-
porate bargaining with labor, certain other corporate dis-
bursements to consumers, in the form of wages and salaries.
But the only large effect of corporation taxes on disburse-
ments to individuals is in cutting dividends and, as dividends
go predominantly to individuals in the high and higher
middle income brackets, this curtailment of individual pur-
chasing power only partly meets the needs enumerated in
earlier chapters.
Therefore, whatever policy is adopted in the matter of cor-
poration taxes, an enlarged flow of incomes to individuals,
particularly in the low and lower middle income brackets,
will continue. Means besides corporation taxes are needed to
destroy the inflationary effects of this excess of spending
power; and such means must reach individual incomes from
all sources, not merely those from dividends, and should be
designed especially to reach incomes in the low and lower
middle brackets. This chapter discusses a group of taxes—
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excises, sales taxes, and customs—that do reach consumer in-
comes in general, when such incomes are spent on particular
consumer commodities and services.
Taxes of this sort, usually called indirect, do not prevent
price increases in consumer goods; indeed they appear to the
consumer, so far as he recognizes them at all, to cause an
increase in prices. Whether they actually do cannot be an-
swered categorically, because the answer varies from case to
case and is in some instances obscure and uncertain. The
range of possibilities may be indicated by considering two
extreme cases. (i) Conditions controlling the market price of
a commodity may be such that a tax on it will raise the price
paid by the consumer by the full amount of the tax, so that
he in reality pays the tax and therefore suffers a loss of spend-
ing power through an indirect payment of tax to the govern-
ment.' (2) Market conditions may be such that the price (total
price paid by the consumer) will not advance after the impo-
sition of the tax, although it may already have advanced for
other reasons; in that case the tax is paid by the seller, out of
his receipts from the sale (or other resources), unless he is able
to pass it back—to force its payment by those who work for
him or supply his materials.
In neither case does the tax prevent a price advance: in the
first case, it actually causes the advance; and in the second,
any advance due to market and other conditions will occur
whether the tax is imposed or not. In both cases the tax trans-
fers civilian spending power to the government: in the first,
it takes from the consumer the additional money he spends
in purchasing the commodity because of the tax; in the sec-
ond, it takes funds from the seller, or from those to whom he
'passes back' the tax.
In the first case, the tax absorbs consumer spending power;
and this absorption assists in meeting the needs outlined in
Chapter Sofar as consumption of the commodities taxed
is especially common among consumers in the income brack-
ets there shown as likely to have the chief excess of spending218 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
power, the bracket above $io,ooo, and especially that from
$1,750 to $io,ooo, this absorption is the more effective in
meeting these needs. Note should be taken, however, of the
probability amounting almost to a certainty that total con-
sumption of the taxed commodity will shrink; in other words,
since consumers will not buy as many units of the commodity
as before, they will not in the aggregate spend on that corn-
modity after the tax is imposed the same amount as before
plus the total tax collected.2 Accordingly, the net reduction
in consumer spending power for buying other commodities
achieved by the tax would be less, and might be very much
less, than the total tax.a
In the second case, unless the seller succeeds in passing the
tax back to his workmen or suppliers, the tax absorbs funds
from business enterprise (the seller), not consumer incomes.
Even if the seller passes the tax back, it may still be borne by
business enterprise, his suppliers of materials or services, al-
though it may be borne by his or their workmen through
lower wages, and thus reduce consumer incomes. When, un-
der this second case, the tax is borne by the enterprise, it has
certain effects similar to those of direct taxes on corporations,
although it reaches unincorporated as well as incorporated
enterprises. It reduces the income which the enterprises can
distribute as dividends or otherwise to their owners, or can
ps enterprises spend on civilian goods. In fact, indirect taxes
expected to be borne by enterprises are sometimes urged as
a means of absorbing profits made by sellers through advanc-
ing prices.
Between the two cases just discussed, a range of possibilities
exists. For a specific commodity the elasticities of demand arid
of supply may be such that the tax will be shared: part will
fall upon the consumer and part on the seller. The relative
shares may vary greatly from commodity to commodity. In
wartime various factors may limit the possibilities. Govern-
mental intervention through direct controls, or enemy action,
may restrict the supply of many commodities and render itINDIRECT TAXES 219
inelastic or nearly so. Moreover, if the supply is cut drasti-
cally, the elasticity of demand may be greatly altered: the
demand for refrigerators, for example, might be highly elastic
if 1,000,000 units were sold annually, but might become rela-
tively inelastic at ioo,ooo units, because the smaller number
would be sought by consumers whose incomes were large
enough for them to purchase even at substantially higher
prices. Again, the wartime general increase in consumer in-
comes might render the demand less elastic for a given total
of sales.4
We consider briefly another type of case which may be
regarded as falling between the two extremes. If the supply
of a commodity is substantially restricted by enemy action or
by governmental direct controls, the price will tend to rise.
The government may then intervene by imposing a price ceil-
ing. Sellers will presumably undertake to comply. But com-
pliance means that sellers will pick and choose their cus-
tomers and regulate the amounts they sell to each; that is,
rationing will be by the sellers, under conditions that can
easily lead to misunderstanding and protests. Suppose the
government then applies an excise to the commodity, and
permits the sellers to add it to the price charged; and suppose
the excise is just large enough to make demand at the new
price equal to supply. This case has certain characteristics of
both extremes discussed above. The distinguishing feature
here is that 'market conditions' are not the sole factors deter-
mining who will bear the tax: the situation, both before and
after the application of the tax, is in large degree governed
by the direct controls imposed by the government. As direct
controls have a large and expanding place in a wartime econ-
omy, the number of commodities for which the situation may
be as outlined here is important.
Not only may the indirect taxes absorb civilian money in.
comes, but they may also, or as an alternative, contribute to
certain other wartime economic objectives; this possibility
appears for certain less extreme cases as well as for such taxes220 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
as come under the first case above. As noted already, con-
sumers may, when faced with the necessity of paying a price
which includes the amount of the tax, scrimp on the commod-
ity: the total expenditure after the imposition of the tax may
be less than the former expenditure plus the tax. Because of
this possibility, the tax becomes a powerful weapon for re-
•stricting the purchase of certain commodities. It thereby
tends to reduce consumption of such commodities, releasing
to the war effort resources which would otherwise be used in
producing those commodities in their former or enlarged
volume.5 Of course the more a tax curtails the purchase of a
Iparticularconsumer good, the more dubious its efficiency in
absorbing consumer money incomes; a tax high enough to
prevent entirely consumption of a particular commodity
would absorb no income.
Indirect taxes of the excise type are sometimes suggested as
meeting a wartime objective—the 'rationing' of a commodity
that is in short supply. What can be achieved in this direction
is narrowly limited, as the more detailed discussion in Sec-
tion i brings out. Such taxes are suggested also as a means of
capturing the windfall profits which arise when the price
system is permitted to effect rationing, by limiting demand
through an advance in price, and this view also is discussed
below. The more important purposes excises can serve in
wartime, apart from providing revenue for the government,
are to absorb civilian money incomes and curtail consump-
tion of specific commodities. We now examine in more detail
the main categories of indirect taxes.
1SELECTIVE EXCISES
The federal tax system already includes a great variety of
excises upon commodities and services, although those im-
posed upon liquors and tobacco are and have long been the
main sources of excise revenue. In the fiscal year 1941, of
$2,399 million collected in excises, $820 million came from
liquor and $6g8 million from tobacco. At the other end ofINDIRECT TAXES 221
the list were such purely regulatory excises as those on man-
huana and colored oleomargarine, which yielded and were
meant to yield an insignificant revenue. No simple descrip-
tion of the wide-ranging objectives—fiscal, sumptuary, mor-
alistic, and regulatory—which underlie the system of excises
would be adequate. A summary even of the objectives under-
lying the use of the excises on liquor and tobacco must omit
important details, since revenue is not the sole aim. In broad
terms, however, these standard and familiar excises have
been designed to produce revenue by tapping individual in-
comes when these are spent for specified commodities. In-
come is transferred by these excises from individuals to the
Treasury in a manner that, in most cases, is administratively
easy.tapping portions of individual incomes spent in par-
ticular directions, revenue is obtained, at least indirectly,
from all consumers who purchase the taxed commodities, in-
cluding people who would not be reached by an income tax
which necessarily exempts a vast number of small incomes.
If a fresh start could be made in framing a program of
excises appropriate to present needs, some of the existing
federal levies might be reduced or even eliminated. But, as
a practical matter, this prospect is not open. Taxpayers have
in most cases adjusted themselves to existing excises; they do
not expect reductions in the near future; and reductions
would probably be repugnant to public opinion when heav-
ier taxation in many directions is both inevitable and desir-
able. En what follows, therefore, the possible advantages of
reductions in the excise system as it stood after the passage
of the 1941 Revenue Act are not considered; and possibilities
of extending the system are discussed.
Excise Taxes as a Means of Curtailing Civilian Consumption
As noted above, the two major wartime economic purposes
to be served by indirect taxes, of which excises constitute a
principal category, are to absorb civilian money incomes and
curtail consumption of civilian goods competitive with de-222 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
fense. At an earlier stage of our defense effort, strong argu-
ments could be advanced that excises were a less satisfactory
mean.s of accomplishing the first purpose than certain other
taxes—personal income taxes for absorbing consumer spend-
ing power, and excess profits and other corporation taxes for
absorbing funds from, enterprises—and that the second was
accordingly the primary purpose of an excise system, and
should largely determine its design. With our active partici-
pation in the war, and the greatly increased magnitude and
urgency of our wartime economic effort, these arguments
have lost some of their force; for excises, as well as other
types of levy, are needed as adding to the total revenue of the
government. Although curtailment of consumption of spe-
cific goods may no longer be regarded as emphatically the
chief objective of the excise system, it remains worthy of con-
siderable attention.
Carefully devised, an excise program may aid in releasing
resources in spheres competitive with defense and, conversely,
allow expansion in areas that are non-competitive and where
resources are idle which cannot be diverted to defense. It can
be used by government to help rearrange resources and to
obtain more speedily what is required for defense. What can
excises on consumer goods and services accomplish to this
end? This is a pertinent question, because the assumption is
made here that, in a war tax program, excises will be imposed
mainly at or near the consumer level. Excises upon raw or
semi-finished articles seem defective in that they provide a
crude and ineffective method of allocation as compared with
direct controls (discussed in Ch. 5). Even at an early stage of
the war program, direct controls seem to have been accepted
as the better alternative for controlling commodities of this
sort.
The present excise system includes a considerable range of
levies on consumer goods into whose production labor and
materials useful for the war program go. To extend these and
to add new excises would be a means of further divertingINDIRECT TAXES 223
these resources from civilian to military uses. Cannot this
diversion be effected more efficiently by direct controls? If
war needs indicate that all or some portion of the resources
used in the manufacture of a consumer good should be shifted
from civilian purposes, why rely on an excise? What rate of
excise will effect this diversion? Unless the tenacity with
which consumers will hold to the article is known and unless
the changes in income which will affect demand can be esti-
mated fairly closely, the excise may be set too high or too low.
Why not intervene directly and restrict the production of the
good by fiat?
Direct restriction will often constitute the chief means, es-
pecially since an outstanding characteristic of current war
finance, in contrast to all previous experience, has been the
extent of resort to direct controls. Government has not at-
tempted merely to bid or tax away from private industry
those types of labor and capital it required; instead it has, in
one way or another, superseded market forces in fulfilling
many of its military requirements. New production of certain
consumer goods competitive with the war program has al-
ready been restricted to quantities specified by the WPB; and
it has been restricted, in other instances, at the level below
the consumer by priorities on the use of many materials, such
as aluminum, zinc, and steel, which make it impossible for
manufacturers of many consumer goods, especially durable,
to maintain their production. In these cases excises have ap-
parently been regarded as an inferior instrument with which
to effect diversion of resources, and the generalization may
be ventured that whenever civilian consumption of a product
is to be cut sharply and whenever the firms in an indus.try are
few, diversion will be effected more easily and speedily by
direct controls. Only when the cut in civilian consumption
is modest and the firms in an industry are so numerous that
extensive policing is required to enforce a governmental de-
cision would excises seem to have advantages. A safe conclu-224 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
sion, therefore, is that in the present emergency diversion of
resources will be a minor rather than a major function of
excises.
Excises have, however, other functions, some of which are
closely connected with the program of direct controls for the
very important reason that, because of direct controls, certain
consumer goods, especially durable (and certain imported
goods), will be in short supply. Whenever the government
restricts the amount of an article which is to be produced,
whether by specifying total production or by limiting the
quantity of raw materials to be used in manufacturing the
article, problems are raised concerning the allocation of the
limited supply among consumers. A simplified illustration
will serve to pose the issues. Suppose that only half as many
bicycles are manufactured in 1942 as in 1941 and that the
unit cost of production is the same.° At existing prices, more
customers will be in the market than can be satisfied. As a
first possibility sellers might allow prices to rise to the level
that will call forth just enough buying to take the short sup-
ply. In this case the market itself automatically provides a
method of allocation, but against this advantage must be set
two serious disadvantages. The sellers would get large wind-
fall profits, and the mere willingness of specific buyers to pay
the higher price may not be the most desirable basis for allot-
ting the short supply among consumers. A second possibility
is that the sellers might keep their prices unchanged and re-
sort to informal rationing on whatever basis they pleased.
This would eliminate their windfall profits, but it is certain
to be unsatisfactory and perhaps intolerable to the pul)lic,
since the sellers might choose to sell or might be suspected by
the public of selling to 'good' customers, relatives, political
friends, etc. A third possibility is that the government itself
should take further steps in intervention by fixing prices and
by establishing rationing on some basis that takes account of
the urgency and social significance of certain individuals' de-
mands. Such a step, although desirable in cases of goods inINDIRECT TAXES 225
widespread and nearly necessitous demand, is bound to be
administratively difficult.
A fourth line of action which may often be more desirable
than any of the foregoing is that the government should im-
pose an excise sufficient to cover the spread between the mar-
ket price after curtailment of output, or after enlargement
of demand in the face of unchanged output, or both, and the
former price. In this case the government might capture the
windfall profits which would otherwise accrue to sellers as a
result of short supplies and higher prices. In avoiding the
administrative problems of a genuine rationing scheme, it
would allow the 'rationing' to be done by prices as under the
first possibility above. The windfall profits are likely to be
appreciable in view of higher prices because, while supply is
being restricted by direct controls or other limiting factors
present in wartime, demand is increasing because of a rise in
money incomes.7
As for the function of allocating goods in short supply
among consumers, an excise provides only what may be called
'price rationing', the 'automatic' rationing achieved by ex-
cluding purchasers unable or unwilling to pay higher prices,
or, if the price system is left free to do the rationing, the
excise is merely a rough means of capturing the windfall
profits. 'Price rationing' is seriously defective when the cut in
civilian consumption of an article has to be sharp, and, if the
article is a necessity, even when it is not sharp. No one would
suggest that the small supply of automobile tires and tubes
could be distributed satisfactorily to civilians by selling to
those willing and able to pay the price (including any appli-
cable excise). The short supply must be put into the hands
of persons to whom it is indispensable from the viewpoint of
the nation in an emergency. And if a necessity, such as milk,
were in short supply, social as well as economic considerations
would indicate that command over money alone should not
determine allocation to individuals. A satisfactory allocation
device is not to be found, therefore, in the application of226 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
excises to necessities, however small or large the cut in their
supply, or even to certain luxuries and semi-luxuries when
the cut is drastic. In these cases a full-fledged scheme of ra-
tioning, not the 'automatic' rationing achieved by price ad-
vances, is appropriate. Partial intervention by setting a price
ceiling puts upon dealers the task of choosing what consumers
shall have the privilege of spending their money for the arti-
cle, since demand can no longer make itself precisely felt in
money terms. Partial intervention by limiting the total pro-
duction of a good has related difficulties, already noted. In
short, satisfactory allocation of such goods among consumers
can be realized only if direct controls include true consumer
rationing, and inadequacy of direct controls cannot be over-
come by excises. We must regard rationing at the consumer
level as not among the primary functions of excises. However,
at a lower level, excises do have a role: by restricting the use
of certain consumer goods, excises reduce the demand for the
various materials and services entering into the taxed articles,
and thereby aid in allocating resources.
Excise Taxes as a Means of Diverting Resources
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the primary purpose
which can feasibly be served by excises is to absorb civilian
spending power, the secondary purpose is to divert resources
from the production of certain civilian goods to the war ef-
fort, and the other suggested purposes are somewhat less
significant. In examining the existing excises and possible
changes in them, we give attention first to the secondary pur-
pose, diversion of resources; because the later analysis in
terms of the first purpose, absorption of income, will prepare
the way for the examination of sales taxes which follows this
section.
We begin with the articles and services already subject to
tax, especially those which seem most directly competitive
with the war program (Table i8). The predominant articles,
except gasoline, are consumer durable. Recent events haveINDIRECT TAXES 227
upset the basis upon which most of the estimatesof revenue
were made; and, looking to the immediate future, little rev-
enue can be expected, because of drastic cuts in or complete
suspension of output, from manufacturers' excises on such
TABLEi8
Excises underthe 1941 Act on Consumer Goods and Services





CATEGORY a RATEb 1942 1943
Automobiles& motorcycles 7 85.8 7.9
Trucks 5 i6.6 14.6
Tires & tubes 5 & 9 cts. per lb. 40.7 20.4
Automobile parts & accessories 7 26.5 no.8
Gasoline 11/2 cts. per gal. 372.5 358.4
Electrical energy, domestic & commercial
consumption 3 50.6 51.7
Lubricating oils 4'/2 cts. per gal. 44.0 45.0
Mechanical refrigerators 10 14.0 5.7
Telegraph, telephone, cable messages 10 44.4 52.8
Telephone bill 6 36.2 56.6
Washing machines 10 .2 .2
Rubber articles 10 8.i 5.9
Electric light bulbs 5 2.4 4.0
Firearms, etc. 10 4.3 4.3
Radios & accessories 1
Phonographs& 10 13.2 12.1
Musical instruments
J
Sportinggoods 10 5.8 ii.8
Luggage 10 2.8 4.5
Electrical appliances 10 6.5 6.7
Photographic apparatus 10 6.i 11.2
Electric signs 10 1.5 i.6
Electric, gas & oil appliances 10 6.5 6.7
Business Sc store machines 10 5.3 4.6
Optical equipment 10 .3 .4
Matches 2 cts. per i,ooo 5.1 8.2
Jewelry 10 34.9 6z.7
Transportation of persons 5 20.8 38.0
Total 855.1 825.8
Some of these categories are less inclusive than their titles seem to imply;
e.g., 'rubber articles' exclude footwear.
bPercent, except as indicated.
Secretary of Treasury, Annual Report, 1941,pp.667.8.228 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
goods as automobiles, motorcycles, tires and tubes, and rub-
ber articles. The production of some other goods in the list
is also being considerably curtailed by direct controls. Yet
continuation of the production and sale of some of these
goods and services is to be presumed, and therefore a more
severe scale of excises will help to divert resources from pro-
ducing those goods to the war effort.
What are the appropriate rates of excises? What rate would
cause, for example, a cut of one-fifth in the consumption of
a given commodity? In the initial selection of new rates, per—
sons with speciaJi knowledge of the markets for the excisable
commodities and who are also informed concerning the pre-
sumptive war requirements could make intelligent guesses.8
The uncertainties imply risks of error in setting rates, and
rates that at any time prove inappropriate would need to be
corrected without great delay. This could be managed if Con-
gress would consent to give the executive authorities some
freedom, within limits set by legislation, with respect to vari-
ation lii rates. Flexible adjustments to a changing situation
and prompt timing of excises would facilitate bringing de-
mand by civilian consumption upon certain resources into
line with the war program with a minimum of lag and lead.
ICertainly,the present rates can be regarded as high only in
comparison with our own tax history; in comparison with
current needs and with the levies in other belligerent coun-
tries, they are modest.
What revenue can advances in rates yield, or what amount
of civilian income can they absorb? Even if the taxes are im-
posed in order to restrict purchases for civilian consumption,
such purchases as do take place will be accompanied by the
payment of taxes and hence by diversion of civilian spending
power to the government. But an advance in the rate of a
particular excise, levied for the purpose of curtailing pur-
chases, will not usually bring a proportionate increment in
the total excise revenue from the commodity, and may not
bring any. For example, doubling the rate per physical unitINDIRECT TAXES 229
might in some cases reduce purchases one-fifth, and the total
excise revenue would then be increased three-fifths. Similarly,
if a doubled rate reduced purchases 30 per cent, the revenue
increase would be two-fifths. The rate might conceivably be
raised so high that the accompanying reduction in purchases
would cause an actual decrease in the excise revenue; and a
still higher rate might in rare cases eliminate purchases, and
thus reduce the excise revenue from that commodity to zero.9
Rates high enough to produce such outcomes are extremely
improbable. The general rule is instead that an advance in
rate will be accompanied by a less than proportionate in-
crease in revenue (other things, including total consumer
incomes, being assumed equal).
Limitations of the increase, or actual reductions, in excise
revenue from higher rates become much more probable and
important if consumption is curtailed also by a powerful sys-
tem of direct controls, such as now operates for numerous
commodities subject to excises. For example, direct controls
on the production and sale of private passenger automobiles
and of tires and tubes are already so drastic that excise rev-
enue from them, at any conceivable rates, will run far below
recent levels. For numerous other commodities the effects of
direct controls in restricting purchases and thereby reducing
excise revenue are not now and may not soon be as drastic;
and, for at least some of these commodities, substantial ad-
vances in existing excise rates might offset the contraction in
purchases, maintaining or even increasing the excise revenue
moderately. Such advances in rates might, of course, cause a
still further contraction in purchases beyond that achieved
by direct controls; but for some commodities subject to dras-
tic direct controls the demand may be so acute after the limi-
tation of supply that increasing the price by the amount of
the added excise would not significantly reduce actual pur-
chases. So far as the latter conclusion is valid, curtailment of
consumption (and diversion of resources) could not be ad-230 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
vanced as the object of higher rates, though windfall profits
would still be captured.
Could the revenue from the portion of the excise system
that relates to such commodities as are listed in Table i 8 be
increased by any feasible rate advances? The answer rests
largely on highly uncertain predictions as to the probable
shortages in and direct controls imposed upon a long list of
commodities. One can say with virtual certainty that, unless
rates are advanced, the actual revenue will run below the
figure given, because consumption will be reduced by short-
ages and direct controls.'° In view of the cuts in consumption,
whether brought about by the excises themselves, direct con-
trols, or other causes, only severe advances in rates could in-
crease or even realize the total revenue as estimated in Table
18. In order to secure an increase as large as $400 million in
the total revenue from excises on the goods listed, very drastic
increases in rates would be necessary.
Although we have been speaking of excises on commodities
such as those of Table i8 in terms of the limitation of civilian
consumption and diversion of resources to war use, such ex-
cises do absorb civilian incomes. They transfer from civilian
possession to government, with negligible reservations, funds
in the full amount of the revenue collected; and civilian
spending power is absorbed in the same amount.
Most of the commodities in Table i 8 are consumer durable
goods, already subject to excise under the 1941Act.Cer-
tain other commodities which may be considered eligible
are listed in Table 19, together with the value of their pro-
duction in 1939.Boththe inclusions and omissions may
arouse dissent. As we are thinking mainly of excises at the
consumer level, the listis intended to exclude producer
goods; but the line between them and consumer goods is
sometimes shadowy. Electric lamps, for example, are used for
business purposes as well as in residences.
If excises are applied to such additional durable commodi-INDIRECT TAXES 231
ties as appear in Table iat rates which on the average run
somewhat above 20 per cent, perhaps $200 million a year
might be absorbed from civilian incomes and added to fed-
eral revenues. Even though taxed at such rates, the articles
would still be cheaper than in any other major industrial
country in the world. Rates of 20 per cent or more might
bring substantial curtailment in consumption of these goods,
diverting resources to the war. The arguments outlined above,
concerning the revenue yield, its relation to direct controls,
the. uncertainty of its estimate, and the incidental effects of
the excise in releasing as well as absorbing purchasing power,
apply to these cases. The effect of direct controls is clearly
apparent in this list, for of certain of the items
is already stopped or severely restricted. In these circum-
stances, the average rate upon the remaining items would
have to be much more severe in order to yield a revenue
approaching $zjoo million.
The list in Table 19 includes, in addition to consumer du-
rable goods, a few that fall in the category of semidurables."
Application of the logic outlined would bring within the
orbit of excises a considerable number of semidurable goods
(and perhaps even a few perishables): woolen and worsted
manufactures, carpets and rugs, etc. Civilian consumption of
articles of this sort has to be curtailed, and excises are one
means to this end. Perhaps the revenue from semidurables
would run, with moderately severe rates, to about half that
realized from the durable goods of the type listed in Table
19, $200 million.
Excises as a Means of A bsorbing Civilian Money Incomes
So far we have been discussing selective excises on commodi-
ties which, in greater or less degree, compete with the war
program and for which the argument can be advanced that
an excise will divert consumption. As noted earlier, this
purpose of an excise is secondary to that of absorbing civilian232 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
TABLE19
AdditionalItems, Chiefly Consumer Durable and Semidurable




Cutlery (cxci. silver & plated cutlery) & edge tools 62 *
Heating& cooking apparatus, except electric 439 *
Householdfurniture 649
Clocks & watches 8i
Watch cases 9
Batteries, domestic 45
Domestic laundry equipment 66
Sewing machines, domestic 13
Silverware 6o
Electric lamps 79
Beauty shop & barber shop equipment 11
Soda fountains 14
Linoleum & other hard floor covering 67




Paints, varnishes & lacquers 416
Oilburners 21
Domestic stokers
Woolen & worsted manufactures 736
Footwear 735
Fabricated textile products other than wearing apparel 317
Carpets & rugs 176 *
Clayproducts, incL pottery & porcelain ware 258 *
Saleof gas, domestic (1940—41) 278
*In1937.
spendingpower, especially as the system of direct controls is
being rapidly extended to accomplish the first purpose. We
therefore now consider excises in terms of their major func-
tion, the absorption of civilian money incomes. An excise sys-
tem established for this purpose might still be selective, but
need not be as selective as one designed to divert resources
to war production: it might and probably would include ex-
cises on many commodities and services noncompetitive withiNDiRECT TAXES 233
defense. The present excise system contains numerous levies
on such commodities (Table 20).
To increase rates of the existing excises on noncompetitive
goods or to extend the list would not serve on a large scale
to direct specific resources toward the requirements of the
TABLE 20
Excises under the 1941 Act on Consumer Goods and Services







Distilled spirits $4.00 per proof gal." 640.0 746.4
Fermented malt liquors $6.oo per bbl. 353.1 367.8
Other 8i.6 101.9
Tobacco, total 772.1 841.4
Cigarettes (small) $3.25 per M. 693.9 763.4
Tobacco i8 cts. per lb. 55.0 53.9
Cigars (large) $2.oo-13.5o per M. 14.1 14.7
Other 9.1 9.4
Stamp 42.9 45.0
Toilet preparations 10% 11.0 20.4
Furs io% 27.2 53.0
Transportation of oil by pipeline 41/2% 13.9 14.2
Safe deposit boxes 20% 3.7 4.4
Admissions to theatres, etc. Approx. 10-1 i% 122.6 159.6
Club dues & initiation fees 9.9 9.9
Sugar 72.2 66.2
Bituminous coal i ct. per ton 4.9 5.3
Use of motor vehicles Sc boats $5-200 per year 70.3 i6i .8
Bowling alleys, billiard Sc pool tables per year Li 1.5
Coin operated amusement Sc gaming
devices $10.50 per year 4.2 5.7
Other 12.7 5.9
Total, exci. tobacco & liquor 396.6 552.9
Total 2,263.72,590.1
* Even some of these commodities may now be regarded as competitive
with the war program. For example, distilled spirits because alcohol is used
for explosives and may be used for rubber, and bituminous coal because of
the shortage of railroad facilities.
"Brandy $3.75 per proof gal.
Secretary of Treasury, Annual Report, 194!,pp.667-8.234 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
emergency; but it would absorb excess money income and
transfer it to the Treasury. This was less desirable in the ear-
her stages of the war effort, because of widespread slack in
our economic system and because the resources required for
producing these commodities were of little or no significance
for the military program, and an increase in production could
in many of these cases be achieved with little or no additional
labor and other resources. If resources already utilized in
their production had been freed by heavier excises, they
would not have been taken up by the government demand
and the result would have been, at least temporarily, unem-
ployment and a check upon the expansion of the national
product. In the present stage of the war effort, however, the
greatly enlarged pressure for diversion of resources makes
this consideration less forceful. Moreover, production and
consumption of many noncompetitive luxuries and semi-
luxuries as such must be sharply restricted, and part of the
restriction can be achieved by excises. Using much labor and
resources in such trades simply cannot be afforded; transfer
to more essential trades (which may already have released re-
sources to war production) must be brought about, even if
direct utilization in war industries is impossible. Workers un-
suitable for the war program may be substituted in essential
civilian industries for those who can be transferred to war
activities. When the war crisis reaches a point where such
transfers of resources become necessary, commodities which
were formerly regarded as noncompetitive become in fact
competitive with the military program.
A further consideration favoring extension of these excises
on noncompetitive goods is that the necessity of absorbing
civilian spending power, to prevent inflation, is so great that
other tax devices and voluntary and forced loans to the gov-
ernment will not fully meet it; and excises may contribute.
The individual income tax has distinct advantages as a device
for reducing consumer income (see Ch. 10-12). But if, for
political or economic reasons, the feasible income tax pro-INDIRECT TAXES 235
gram is inadequate, excises on consumer goods could be
urged as an inferior alternative, yet an alternative emphati-
cally superior to inflation. Even though excises are generally
recognized as lacking some advantage,s an income tax has as
a means of absorbing consumer incomes, public policy may
be shaped by the purely practical consideration that a com-
bination of the two devices might be more acceptable to the
people than a very severe application of the one device which
is admittedly preferable. Public opinion, which is never ex-
actly known and is in any case a rough composite of many
divergent viewpoints, may hold or be supposed by political
leadership to hold that less discomfort and hardship would
follow if the total consumer income to be taxed away were
taken, not through a single tax however efficient, but through
a variety of taxes all of which did not hit the taxpayer at the
same time and in the same way. Such an attitude, however
lacking in logic, may be a powerful factor in guiding tax
policy.
How much additional revenue can be gained from in-
creases in existing excises and addition of new excises on
noncompetitive goods? Present excises on such goods are esti-
mated to yield, for the fiscal year 1943, $2.6 billion. We have
not examined carefully a list of specific commodities on which
present rates could be advanced, or to which new excises
could be applied, but believe that moderately severe advances
might raise about $500 million additional. If severer rates
were applied, especially on such widely used commodities as
beverages and tobacco, the increase might reach a much
higher figure, perhaps nearly $i billion, roughly the amount
estimated in the Treasury program for this type of tax.
The immediately foregoing discussion, concerning the
grounds upon which noncompetitive commodities may ad-
visedly be subjected to excises, applies also to commodities
which are competitive with defense. For them also, an excise
absorbs private spending power; and the further fact that
excises on them may aid the war effort by reducing their con-236 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
sumption is merely another strong reason for taxing them.
But even if this reason did not exist; if, for example, their
consumption were curtailed by direct controls alone, the ne-
cessity of absorbing consumer spending power would be a
factor favoring excises on them, to the same extent as it favors
excises on noncompetitive goods.
On the basis of our very rough estimates the yield of such
higher rates and new excises as have been discussed above
would amount to about $5 billion (Table 21). With negli-
gible reservations, this entire sum, or such other sum as the
excise system actually adopted may yield, would be a draft on
civilian incomes; and a very large part of it would be a draft
on the spending power of consumers. As the official estimates
for existing excises and our estimates for new excises have
already been brought seriously in question by direct limita-
tions on output of certain commodities, and as further de-
velopments in this direction are in prospect, the $5 billion
figure is an outside limit for revenue under the rates herein
discussed.
2 SALES TAX OR GENERAL EXCISE
Ageneral sales tax as a means of approaching the chief objec-
tives set for a war finance program is frequently suggested
TABLE 21
EstimatedExcise Revenue Possibilities, Fiscal Year 1943
MILLIONS
OF DOLLARS




Accordingto our very rough estimates, from additional and new excises
Additional on competitive goods 400.0
New on competitive durable goods 400.0
New on competitive semidurable goods 200.0
Additional on noncompetitive goods 500.0
Total additional 1,500.0
Total (in round figures) 5,000.0INDIRECT TAXES 237
and merits attention here. It not only is a direct means of
absorbing consumer spending power; but it appears as a tax
on spending rather than on saving, although its final effect
may in many cases be to reduce saving. Application of a fed-
eral sales tax at the retail distribution, or even the wholesale,
stage would encounter certain obstacles in administration.
This might suggest that a federal sales tax would take the
form of a general excise, applied at the level of sales by manu-
facturers or other producers. Although a federal sales tax ap-
plied at the level of manufacturers or other producers is with-
out doubt more feasible administratively than one applied
at the distribution level, experience with federal sales taxes
on certain commodities at the retail distribution level indi-
cates that the administrative obstacles are not decisive. Espe-
cially when various other elements of the tax structure must
be elaborated to a degree and in a manner greatly increasing
the administrative task, the argument that a retail sales tax
cannot easily be administered loses much of its force. A posi-
tive argument in favor of applying a federal sales tax at the
retail level may be advanced with particular force when one
of the main objectives of tax policy is to absorb civilian in-
come. A sales tax at the retail level falls upon the commodity
after various additional costs, such as for transportation, stor-
age, and distribution, not included at the level of the manu-
facturer or other producer, have entered into its price. The
retail sales tax is accordingly a much more comprehensive
levy upon the total value of consumer goods than is a general
manufacturers' excise. The same rate will yield much more
revenue if applied at the retail level than at the manufac-
turers'.
A 'general' excise, as distinct from the selective excises ex-
amined in the preceding section, on manufacturers and other
producers, or a retail sales tax, would presumably not cover
all goods. Furthermore, it would presumably be at a flat rate
for all commodities taxed, although no insuperable obstacles
'appear to the application of somewhat different rates to dif-238 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
ferent commodities; but if different rates were applied, the
excise would lose an essential element of its 'generality' and
become in truth a combination of several selective excises.
Moreover, in addition to a general excise at a moderate flat
rate, selective excises at rates varying from commodity to
commodity might be applied to specific commodities. In any
case, a general excise would cover numerous commodities,
including many not directly competitive with defense through
the use of materials and equipment and labor needed for de-
fense. So far as the general excise fell upon these noncom-
petitive commodities, it would, like the selective excises on
similar commodities discussed at the end of the preceding
section, afford merely a means of absorbing consumer in-
comes by raising prices above the level they would otherwise
reach.
Chapter io indicates that such a use of excises, to absorb
consumer spending power, is on certain grounds less satisfac-
tory than an income tax to tap that power directly. The in-
come tax absorbs some of the total spending power as such
and leaves the consumer free to dispose of the remainder as
he chooses in the light of supplies and prices. It can be de-
signed to protect from tax levy some minimum amount of
income regarded as basically necessary for individual con-
sumption. The excise or salestax, as ordinarily
applied,lacks these advantages. So faras a completely
general excise at uniform rates cannot be realized—and vari-
ous political and practical considerations indicate strongly
that any feasible excise will fall far short of generality—the
absorption of money spending power is somewhat haphazard.
Some consumers will use more of their means on taxed com-
modities and less on untaxed than others. And each con-
sumer, while free to dispose of his purchasing power, wi]l be
influenced in his choices by the differential effects of the tax
upon prices of various commodities. Finally, and this is one
of the most forceful objections, the excise tax falls upon pur-
chases from the bare minimum of purchasing power as wellINDIRECT TAXES 239
as other purchases. Persons whose incomes do not exceed the
cost of the recognized minimum needs for subsistence and
such comforts as are regarded essential for public health and
morale must pay the excise. Even if the rate is only moder-
ately heavy, they may have to forego consumption recognized
as essential from, a national point of view. This objection is,
however, not insuperable. Some device might be worked out
by which consumers would be given certificates enabling
them to purchase, free from the general excise, amounts up
to the recognized minimum of essential consumption; or pro-
vision might be made for free distribution to all ,of tax-paid
stamps covering an amount of consumption intended to be
exempt. Whether the administrative difficultiesoperating
such a device are decisive cannot be foreseen with certainty,
but recent experience with rationing leads us to believe that
they are not bound to be decisive.
Even though the income tax is recognized as having certain
advantages over the sales tax as a device for absorbing con-
sumer spending power, a practical warrant for applying the
sales tax in addition to a less drastic income tax may be found
along lines noted in the closing argument of the preceding
section. As a practical political matter, the possibly greater
acceptability to the public of a combination of the two taxes
than of a more severe application of the income tax alone
may be adequate reason for the adoption of a general sales
tax.
Advocates of the sales tax also urge that it has certain ad-
vantages over the income tax as a means of absorbing pur-
chasing power. Like all excises, it is collected promptly and
therefore promptly absorbs spending power; whereas the in-
come tax, as flow constituted, taps purchasing power only
after it has been in the hands of taxpayers many months fol-
lowing the receipt of income..Thisdisadvantage of the in-
come tax might be largely removed if an effective stoppage-
at-the-source device were provided (see Ch. i 1): Even then,
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businesses, including farms, and from rented real estate, can-
not effectively be stopped at the source, the sales tax would
offer a means of prompt rather than delayed collection. More-
over, regardless of what is done about stoppage-at-the-source,
the income tax fails to reach adequately all consumer incomes
which can contribute to excess demand for the supply of con-
sumer goods. Among the missed, in whole or in
part, are income from tax-exempt securities, chiefly of states
and local governments; from unincorporated businesses, espe-
cially farms; and of low bracket individuals who have enjoyed
a large increase of income from the war effort and are likely
to spend rather than save most of it, and whose income, even
if it is above the minimum exempt from income tax, may not.-
be taxed because of the great difficulty of enforcing the law.
Income from these sources might escape the income tax but
could not escape the sales tax, so far as that income was used
to purchase commodities subject to a sales tax.
The advocates contend also that, if a sales tax is not im-
posed, enough civilian spending power can be absorbed by
the income tax only if such high rates, even on the lowest
brackets, are set that many taxpayers would suffer severe
hardship (see Ch. io), especially those with relatively fixed
incomes, who constitute a very substantial fraction of all pres-
ent income taxpayers. For many such persons, the lower in-
come tax which would be feasible if a sales tax were adopted
would leave a larger share of their incomes free from taxes
and other fixed charges for meeting the higher cost of living.
In disposing of this free part of their incomes they could not
of course avoid the sales tax on commodities subject to it, but
they might find it possible and even necessary to choose their
purchases with a view to minimizing payments of the tax.
Considerations of the foregoing type strengthen the prac-
tical political consideration mentioned above as possibly jus-
tifying a combination of sales tax, despite its regressivity,
with a moderately severe income tax, instead of using a very
severe income tax alone. If the major defect of the sales tax,INDIRECT TAXES 241
its impact upon the minimum of income essential to sustain
life, health, and morale, can be overcome by some workable
device such as tax-paid stamps, the case for its inclusion in a
war finance program might well prove decisive.
The revenue possibilities of a sales tax or general excise
cover a wide range, depending mainly upon the flat tax rate
applied but also upon the generality with which the tax
covers commodities and services. A very general tax at a
moderate rate (not far from 5 per cent), after allowance for
excluding the minimum consumption needs from tax, might
yield from to $2 billion, and more severe but perhaps
feasible rates might raise the amount to fromtobillion.
A drastic rate, while adding to the revenue from the general
excise, might mean some reductions in revenue derivable
from the selective excises.
3 CUSTOMS
For. one category in the system of indirect taxes, customs du-
ties, the analysis in the two preceding sections does not ap.ply,
or applies imperfectly or even in reverse. Customs duties,
though before the adoption of the Income Tax Amendment
in 1913 a major source of federal revenue, are no longer re-
lied upon heavily for revenue. They are in fact designed pri-
marily to implement the international trade policy of the
government, a policy which, in greater or less degree, aims at
restricting imports of goods competitive with domestic prod-
ucts. Because of recent restrictions upon our international
commerce occasioned by shipping shortages and other causes
incident to the war, revenue from customs has been declining
even from the moderate levels of the 'thirties.
Recognizing the long-run trade policy of the government,
one might infer that no possibility exists of enlarging sub-
stantially the revenue from customs, and absorbing civilian
spending power by this means. Advances in rates of duty on
commodities competitive with domestic products, already
largely or entirely excluded from import by existing duties,242 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
would not increase revenue; and substantial advances in the
rates on Certain other competitive commodites might reduce
or eliminate their import and hence reduce rather than in-
crease revenue.'2 Advances in the rates on commodities not
produced domestically, provided the demand for the com-
modities is sufficiently inelastic, and imposition of duties on
additional commodities in this category, would indeed in-
crease revenue, provided other causes did not reduce imports.
For such commodities, a duty is closely similar to an excise
on a domestically produced commodity; and the arguments
of the preceding sections, concerning absorption of purchas-
ing power and other economic effects, apply without signifi-
cant qualification.
But the especially important possibility for securing an
increase in the revenue from customs lies in reductions rather
than advances in rates. The commodities involved are, of
course, in the first category mentioned, those competitive
with domestic products. Reduction in the duty on any such
commodity now excluded by a high duty might lead to a
resumption of imports, and thereby enlarge total customs rev-
enue. Reduction in the duty on any such commodity, present
importation of which is somewhat restricted by the existing
duty, might lead to an increase in importation; and if the
increase were somewhat greater proportionately than the de-
crease in the rate of duty, the revenue would rise. For both
these cases, however, shortage of shipping or other causes
might prevent additional importation, or even reduce the
former volume, and the rate of customs duty would lose its
significance.
Under the existing law, some such reduction in rate (up
to 50 per cent) can be accomplished by executive discretion
and does not need legislative action, although various other
obstacles to prompt action might appear. With our present
economic situation marked by acute shortages in many lines,
the argument for protecting domestic producers from for-
eign competition by very high duties may temporarily atINDIRECT TAXES 243
least have lost some of its force, particularly with reference to
certain commodities on the protected list. On such commodi-
ties in whièh domestic shortages are especially acute, reduc-
tion of duties may prove a substantial aid in importing goods
from abroad to make up the shortages; and this argument
would hold even if no additional revenue were yielded. On
these grounds, the executive branch of the government may
wish to consider carefully reductions in rate, within the 50
per cent rule, on certain commodities. If such action is taken,
the total customs revenue might be augmented substantially.
Reductions in rates exceeding 50 per cent would require
legislative action; and the great complexity of the tariff struc-
ture and the prolonged Congressional study involved in any
legislative change therein render of doubtful wisdom any
consideration in wartime of such drastic reductions. The
same statements apply with respect to advances in rates or
the imposition of new duties on commodities not produced
domestically; although the close similarity of this case to ex-
cises might lead to more prompt and easy legislative action
than if the question were that of reducing rates on competi-
tive goods.
NOTES
1Whethera tax will fall under this first case is not determined by the form
of the statute imposing the tax. Thus a statute directing that the seller shall
collect 'from the purchaser' io per cent of the selling price, as a tax, does
not necessarily mean that the consumer will pay io per cent more than
formerly. Unless market conditions are such asto bring the commodity
under case (i), the seller might reduce his 'selling price' so that the total
paid by the purchaser, including the tax, would be the same as before the
tax was imposed; and the tax on this commodity would then fall under case
(2),despiteany intent written into the law. Here, as in other cases, economic
forces, not legal measures, determine who will bear a tax.
2Ifconsumer incomes are rising, the actual expenditure after tax is imposed
may in fact exceed the previous expenditure (at the lower level of income)
plus the tax.
3Thispoint is treated more fully in Sec. iinthe detailed comment on selec-
tive excises, and bears upon the somewhat different function of excises in
curtailing consumption which is discussed immediately below.244 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
4Inthis and the foregoing paragraphs the reasoning runs in terms of a
consumer good. With some adaptations, similar reasoning applies to a
ducer good, such as motor trucks, or gasoline for business use, tr an inclus-
trial raw material, to which an excise might be applied.
5Theargument takes a somewhat different form for one category of indirect
taxes, customs duties, discussed in Sec. 3.
6Thisassumption is most convenient for purposes of exposition. It can be
replaced by different assumptions without damaging the main thread of the
argument.
Circumstances can, however, easily be conceived in which the windfall
profit would not be large: for example, if a diminished supply of the civilian
good was produced at a sharply higher unit cost, or if the capital employed
by the firm to make the civilian good could not be shifted to war uses. Even
if costs per unit did not change, the total profit, on the smaller volume at a
higher price, might not be greater.
8a general rule, demand for most durable goods is presumed to be elastic
(the volume demanded declines more than proportionately as the price rises),
but in a period of rapidly growing general demand this rule is of little use.
Moreover, when supplies are small, demand may become more and more
inelastic, in which case very heavy excises would be required to be effective
for purposes of diversion.
9Theargument, substantially along reverse lines, in connection with pos-
sible increases in revenue from reductions in the rates of customs duties, is
introduced in Sec.
10 Someexpected cuts in consumption were taken into account when the
estimates reported in the table were made, as evidenced by the declines from
1942to1943inthe revenue from automobiles and tires and tubes and gaso-
line, but further cuts have occurred since.
11Saleof gas for domestic consumption is also included here. An excise on
it would seem to be parallel to the existing levy upon the sale of electrical
energy for domestic consumption, although this industry has not been ex-
panding as rapidly as the electrical energy industry.
12Actuallysome increase in the rates on certain of these commodities might
lead to a somewhat less than proportionate decrease in the amount imported,
and thus enlarge somewhat the total revenue.